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nal&external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single 
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single agreement and exclusive is superior to open membership in welfare and ecological 
terms. Moreover, we show the importance of transfers for successful treaty-making. We relate 
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1. Introduction 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001) the enhanced 
greenhouse effect, caused by anthropogenic emissions of so-called greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
like carbon dioxide and methane, will negatively affect living conditions of current and future 
generations in almost all regions of the world. The enhanced greenhouse effect is a typical 
example of a global common problem. In every country, a multitude of fossil fuel users (cars, 
lorries, households, industries and farmers) emit GHGs that dissipate into the atmosphere 
where they mix uniformly. Since the global atmosphere is an open-access depository of 
GHGs, individual polluters have no incentive to internalize their climate change externalities. 
As it is well-known, this non-cooperative situation is not optimal from the global society´s 
point of view (Cornes and Sandler 1996; Endres 1997, Tahvonen 1994 and Eyckmans et al. 
1993). In order to reach a globally optimal solution, some kind of international coordination 
of climate policies is needed. However, economists are skeptical about the prospects of 
effective international policy coordination due to free-rider incentives and the lack of a supra-
national enforcement power. 
The bulk of the environmental economics literature has been using non-cooperative game 
theory
1 to explain the problems of forming coalitions by applying the concept of internal and 
external stability (I&E-S; e.g., Barrett 1994, Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, Hoel 1992 and 
Rubio and Ulph 2001). It is assumed that countries forming an international environmental 
agreement (IEA), i.e., a non-trivial coalition
2, coordinate their policies by jointly maximizing 
the aggregate welfare to their coalition. An IEA is said to be internally stable if none of its 
members wants to leave; it is externally stable if none of the outsiders wants to join it. A key 
result of this literature, which has been called a paradox by Barrett (1994), is that whenever 
cooperation (global optimum) would generate large global welfare gains compared to a non-
cooperative situation (Nash equilibrium), stable coalitions achieve only little. Moreover, it is 
pointed out that from participation one cannot conclude success of cooperation: small coali-
tions may achieve more than large coalitions in terms of global welfare and emission reduc-
tion.
3  
                                                 
1   For a discussion about the differences between non-cooperative and cooperative game theory see 
Bloch (1997), Finus (2003a) and Finus and Rundshagen (2003b). For cooperative game theory 
approaches to IEAs see for instance Chander and Tulkens (1995) and (1997), Eyckmans and 
Tulkens (1999) and Funaki and Yamato (1999). 
2   A non-trivial coalition is a coalition of at least two members. 
3   For an overview of assumptions and results of game theoretical analyses of IEAs see Finus (2001 
and 2003a).   2
I&E-S makes at least two implicitly assumptions that have been questioned by Carraro (1997) 
for the first time in the context of IEAs. First, I&E-S restricts coalition formation to only one 
(non-trivial) coalition. That is, countries have only the option to join an agreement or to 
remain a non-signatory (singleton) but cannot group into different agreements. Clearly from a 
theoretical point of view, such a restriction is not satisfactory. The key questions are whether 
countries will form “regional agreements” instead of one “global agreement” if this assump-
tion is given up and if so whether “multiple agreements” are superior to a “single agreement” 
in welfare or ecological terms.
4 From the theoretically oriented literature (e.g., Carraro 2000, 
Carraro and Marchiori 2003, Finus 2001 and 2003b and Finus and Rundshagen 2003a) it 
appears that, indeed, in equilibrium multiple coalitions will emerge. However, those results 
have been derived under the assumption of symmetric (identical) players and welfare and 
ecological conclusions can only be derived for even more restrictive assumptions. Thus, it is 
the first objective of this paper to analyze the effect of single versus multiple coalition forma-
tion under more realistic assumptions, using data from an integrated assessment model of cli-
mate change.
5  
However, this issue has also an empirical dimension that may seem more controversial. On 
the one hand, one may argue that all IEAs that have been signed up to now are single agree-
ments. There is only one Montreal Protocol that regulates CFCs (chloro-fluoro-carbons), one 
Oslo Protocol that aims at reducing sulfur emissions and only one Kyoto Protocol with the 
objective to mitigate global warming. On the other hand, at least for more recent protocols, it 
is evident that members are treated differently and that therefore these protocols may be inter-
preted as multiple coalitions agreements.
6 For instance, the Kyoto Protocol distinguishes 
between Annex-B- and non-Annex B-countries where only the former group has agreed to 
quantified emission ceilings. Another example is the Montreal Protocol that makes special 
                                                 
4   “Regional or multiple agreements” means a coalition structure with multiple non-trivial coali-
tions and a “global or single agreement” is a coalition structure with only one non-trivial coali-
tion where a coalition structure is a partition of N players. For details see section 2. 
5   Integrated assessment models of climate change combine a stylized version of the world econ-
omy with a synthetic model of the global carbon cycle and climate and contain a full feedback of 
the physical environment on the economy. The seminal models in the field of climate change are 
DICE by Nordhaus (1993) and RICE by Nordhaus and Yang (1996). 
6   This is different for “old IEAs” that typically require a uniform emission reduction by all partici-
pants. Examples include the Helsinki Protocol in 1985 on sulfur emission reduction (uniform 
reduction of 30% compared to 1980 emissions), the Sofia Protocol in 1988 on nitrogen oxides 
emission reduction (uniform requirement to freeze emissions at 1987 levels) and the Geneva 
Protocol in 1991 on the reduction of volatile organic compounds (uniform reduction of 30% 
compared to 1988 emission levels).   3
provisions for developing countries, allowing for a longer transition period for compliance 
with abatement targets, exempting them from certain regulations and providing the option to 
draw on funds that are financed by developed countries. 
Intuitively, we expect that allowing for the possibility to form multiple coalitions will increase 
the success of international pollution control. Regional agreements allow for more flexibility 
in coordinating different interests. Countries with similar interests will gather in a coalition. 
Hence, the free-riding problem will be less pronounced because of “homogenous coalitions”. 
Some countries that would not join the global agreement because they find abatement efforts 
too ambitious might form a regional agreement with like-minded countries, implementing at 
least moderate abatement targets. Thus if no large single agreement is stable, small regional 
agreements may be a pragmatic second best solution.  
The second assumption of I&E-S is that of open membership, which follows from the defini-
tion of external stability. That is, countries can join an agreement without the consent of 
existing members. Hence, it is easy for outsiders to upset a potentially stable coalition, i.e., a 
coalition that is internally stable. Consequently from a theoretical point of view, it is evident 
that some form of exclusive membership may help to stabilize IEAs (e.g., Carraro and 
Marchiori 2003 and Finus and Rundshagen 2003a,c). Less evident is the question what “more 
stability” means in terms of welfare and ecological variables (emissions and concentration). 
Again, the theoretical literature can only provide partial answers since results have been 
derived under very restrictive assumptions (e.g., symmetric countries and static payoff struc-
ture). Thus, it is the second aim of this paper to analyze open versus exclusive membership 
based on more realistic assumptions, using data from an integrated assessment climate model. 
From an empirical point of view, it is interesting to observe that currently all existing IEAs 
that deal with global environmental problems are of an open membership nature. For instance, 
the Kyoto Protocol does not require any voting before a new country can accede. However, 
other international institutions (that do not necessarily deal with global public goods or bads) 
require the consent of all their existing members before a newcomer can join. For instance, 
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and WTO (Word Trade Organization) vote by 
unanimity on new members. Also the accession of ten new countries to the EU (European 
Union) had to be approved unanimously by the European Council, though approval in the 
European Parliament required only a simple majority. Thus, our modification of open mem-
bership may be interpreted as applying typical club good rules to the public good agreement 
IEA.    4
In this paper, we focus on two extreme types of exclusive membership rules. The first rule 
assumes that only if 50 percent or more of the coalition members are in favor of accession, the 
potential entrant is allowed to join. We call this exclusive membership majority voting. The 
second rule assumes that only if all members agree to accession, an outsider is permitted to 
join. We call this exclusive membership unanimity voting. Other exclusive membership rules 
(e.g., 2/3 qualified majority rule) can be considered as intermediate cases but are not analyzed 
in this paper.  
Taken together, we believe our paper extends previous work in three directions. Firstly, it is in 
the tradition of public choice theory that analyzes the effect of different voting procedures on 
the provision of public (or club) goods (see, in general for public good provision: Mueller, 
2003 or Guttman, 1998. For IEAs in particular, see: Eyckmans 1999 and Finus and 
Rundshagen 1998). However, most of this work has been focusing on the level of public good 
provision, the choice of emission reduction targets or environmental policy instruments that is 
associated with decisions in the second stage of coalition formation. In contrast, we focus on 
different membership rules (single versus multiple coalitions and open versus exclusive mem-
bership) that are associated with the first stage of the coalition formation process in which 
countries decide on their participation (see section 2 for details).  
Secondly, as mentioned above, our paper is inspired by recent developments in non-coopera-
tive game theory that question fundamental assumptions of the traditional stability analysis of 
IEAs (e.g., Carraro 1997 and 2000). In contrast to this literature that has assumed symmetric 
countries, we analyze those issues based on a data set derived from an integrated assessment 
climate model. Thirdly, our paper is in the tradition of the literature that empirically tests sta-
bility of climate coalitions (e.g., Bosello et al. 2001, Botteon and Carraro 1997, Buchner et al. 
2002, Finus et al. 2003 and Tol 2001). In contrast to the bulk of this literature, we pay more 
attention to the game theoretic underpinning of our model, consider modification of standard 
stability concepts and use an integrated assessment climate model that captures all important 
dynamic aspects of the greenhouse gas problem.  
In the following, we lay out the game theoretical setting in section 2 and describe the empiri-
cal module of our model in section 3. Stable coalition structures are reported and evaluated in 
section 4. Section 5 summarizes our main findings and concludes with some final remarks.   5
2.  The Game Theoretic Background of Coalition Formation 
2.1  The Two-Stage Game 
Coalition formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage players (i.e., countries 
or regions) decide on their membership in a coalition, in the second stage coalition members 
choose their economic strategies.  
First Stage 
The decision in the first stage is modeled as a coalition game. Its definition comprises three 
elements: 1) the set of players I={1, ..., N} with a particular player denoted by index i or j, 
2) the set of coalition (or, alternatively, announcement) strategies  12 N Σ =Σ ×Σ × ×Σ …  with a 
particular strategy of player   denoted by  i ∈I i i σ ∈Σ , and 3) a coalition function   that maps 
membership strategies σ=  into coalition structures, 
ψ
:C : 1 ..., ) σ N ) ( , σ ( ψ Σ→ σ ψ   σ . A 
coalition structure   is a partition of players where a particular coalition is 
denoted by c ,  ,   " kπl, 
1 ..., c
)






k cI = ∪  and cC ∈  where C is the set of all 
possible coalition structures.  
We consider two coalition games in the spirit of Yi and Shin´s (1995) open membership game 
that we call single and multiple coalition game. The single coalition game captures the notion 
that players can only choose between strategy  i 0 σ =  that means “I do not want to sign the 
agreement” and   that means “I want to sign the agreement”. More formally, we have:  i 1 σ=
Definition 1: Single Coalition Game (SCG) 
a) The set of coalition strategies of player iŒI, I={1,…, N}, is given by   where a 
particular strategy 
i {0,1} Σ =
i σ  is an announcement of an address. 
b) Let c
i denote the coalition to which player i will belong. Coalition function   maps 
strategy vector 
SCG ψ





{j/ 1 }i f 1
σ
σσ
 =  = 
==  
 . 
In order to capture the possibility that players can form multiple or regional agreements, we 
have to increase the number of coalition strategies. Since the maximum number of coalitions 
is N (all players form a singleton coalition), the strategy set must comprise now N instead of 
only two strategies. In terms of the coalition function we have to ensure that those players that 
have made the same announcement will form one coalition. Thus, we have:   6
Definition 2: Multiple Coalition Game (MCG) 
a) The set of coalition strategies of player iŒI, I={1,…, N}, is given by   where 
a particular strategy 
= i {1,...,N } Σ
i σ  is an announcement of an address. 
b) Let c
i denote the coalition to which player i will belong. Coalition function 
MCG ψ  maps 
strategy vector σ  into coalition structure c as follows: 
i c{ i = }  »  Ô {j = ij } σ σ . 
From Definition 1 and 2 it is evident that the outcome of the coalition game will be a coalition 
structure of the form c . In the case of the MCG, coalitions c  may be 
non-trivial coalitions whereas in the SCG they are always singletons. If M=N (each player is 
in a singleton coalition), this corresponds to the singleton coalition structure and if M=1 (all 
players are in one coalition), this is called the grand coalition. 





The decision in the second stage depends on the rules how players choose their economic 
strategies that follow from the definition of the valuation function. The valuation function 
 maps coalition structures into a vector of individual payoffs (i.e., welfare) via an instruc-
tion how players choose their economic strategies 
v(c)
i sS ∈ , with SS 12 S S N = ××× … , for a 
given coalition structure c. Hence, the valuation function is a composition of two functions 
 where   is a function mapping coalition structures into economic 
strategies and   is a function mapping economic strategies into welfare 
levels.  
vw =ε   :C S : c ( c ) ε→ ε  
N w:S :s w( s) →   R
More specifically, let the welfare function of player i in the global warming game be given by 
 where s is a vector of economic strategies. That is, welfare of player i depends on his 
own strategy s  and those of other players, s
i w( s )
i i − . The exact relationship between economic 
strategies (e.g., emission abatement and capital investment) and welfare as well as the ele-
ments in players´ welfare function will be outlined in section 3. For the valuation function - 
mapping coalition structures into payoffs - we make the following standard assumptions 
(Bloch 1997 and Yi 1997): 
Definition 3: Valuation Function 
Fix a coalition structure  , let  =
1M c (c ,...,c ) = v(c ) { } i v(c) iŒI={ i w( (c)) ε }iŒI ={
∗
i w(s )} iŒI  
and assume for instruction ε  that all players belonging to a coalition  Œc jointly maximize 
the aggregate payoff to their coalition. Let   denote the economic strategy vector of coali-
k c
k s  7
tion   and   the economic strategy vector of all other coalitions c Œc,l , and assume 
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Definition 3 implies that the valuation of player i,  , is identified by the entire coalition 
structure c and not only by the coalition to which he belongs. Players behave cooperatively 
within their coalition but non-cooperatively against players belonging to other coalitions when 
choosing their economic strategies. Put differently, members of a non-trivial coalition act as 
one single player maximizing the aggregate welfare to their coalition and coalitions play a 
Nash strategy in terms of economic strategies. Hence, economic strategies within a coalition 
are chosen efficiently. Consequently, the singleton coalition structure (grand coalition) 
implies an equilibrium economic strategy vector corresponding to the "classical" Nash equi-
librium (social optimum). Thus, the highest global welfare will be obtained in the grand coa-
lition, and any welfare level below that in any other coalition structure. Hence, inefficiencies 
in policy coordination must solely stem from the fact that countries do no form the grand coa-
lition in the first stage of coalition formation since within coalitions economic strategies are 
efficiently chosen in the second stage. 
i v (c)
Definition 3 implicitly assumes no transfers. This is one option that we consider in our simu-
lations below, which we call the "no transfer case". Alternatively, we consider a second 
option to which we refer to as the "transfer case". Of course, there are many possibilities how 
the gains of cooperation could be distributed among coalition members as for instance the 
Shapley value (Barrett 1997, Botteon and Carraro 1997) or the Chander/Tulkens´ transfer 
scheme (Chander and Tulkens 1997). We restrict ourselves to a modified version of the last 
transfer scheme of which the details will be laid out in section 3. At this stage, it suffices to 
point out that this transfer scheme assumes a particular rule how the surplus from cooperation 
within a coalition is distributed. Hence,  c ) t +  where   implies that a player 





2.2  Stability in the Reduced Stage Game 
For the properties of the welfare function that we define in section 3 it turns out that s  is 
unique and lies well within the boundaries of the economic strategy space. Thus, there is a 
unique valuation (vector of individual payoffs) that is associated with each coalition structure 
. Consequently, the entire coalition formation process can be reduced to one single 
stage. This reduced stage game looks as follows: each player chooses his/her coalition strat-
egy,  , either according to Definition 1 (SCG) or Definition 2 (MCG), the strategy vector 
*
c ∈
i σ  8
1 ( ,..., ) σ= σ σ N  is mapped into coalition structure c, leading to valuation  . 
Hence, we can define stable coalition structures in terms of 
1N v (v ,...,v ) =
i v( ( ) ) ψ σ , but write only  i v( ) σ  in 
the following if no misunderstanding is possible. More specifically, we can define stability in 
terms of equilibrium announcements 
***
1 ( ,..., ) N σ =σ σ  leading to coalition structure  , and 
possible deviations  , leading to some coalition structure 
* c
*
i σ≠ σ i
* c c ≠ , which should not pay 
in equilibrium. 
There are many ways to define stability in the context of single and multiple coalitions, cap-
turing the notions of open and exclusive membership. We chose definitions that are inspired 
by Carraro (1997 and 2000) which are closely related to the concept of internal&external sta-
bility in order to stress similarities and differences. Moreover, we chose a compact definition 
to highlight differences in terms of membership rules. We start by defining stability in the 
single coalition game.  
Single Coalition Game 
Regardless which membership rule we consider, it is evident that no signatory should have an 
incentive to leave the agreement. This corresponds to the notion of internal stability. More-
over, an equilibrium coalition structure should also not be upset by a non-signatory joining the 
agreement. Under open membership, this requires that no non-signatory has an incentive to 
join the agreement. This is the classical definition of external stability that we call external 
stability condition 1 in Definition 4 below. Of course, if no non-signatory has an incentive to 
join the agreement, then an agreement is also stable under exclusive membership. In other 
words, there is no need to vote on accession since no outsider will submit an application for 
joining the agreement anyway. However, suppose a non-signatory has an incentive to join, 
then under exclusive membership the members of the agreement have to decide whether to 
accept a new member (external stability condition 2 in Definition 4 below). Due to the 
assumption of complete information, all members can evaluate whether they would benefit 
from the enlarged coalition. Under majority voting, accession will be accepted if a (strict) 
majority is in favor of the application (external stability condition 2.1) and under unanimity 
voting only if all members are in favor (external stability condition 2.2). In other words, a 
coalition structure that is not externally stable under open membership may be stable under 
exclusive membership if a (weak) majority (majority voting) or at least one member (unanim-
ity voting) is against accession. More formally, we have:   9
Definition 4:  Stability in the Single Coalition Game (SCG) 
In the single coalition game, denote the set of players that announce   by I
*
i 0 σ =
NC with typi-
cal element i and the set of players that announce  =
j
* 1 σ  by I
C with typical element j 
(
NC I «
C I =∆). Let the set I
C comprise /I
C/ players and let S be a subgroup of /S/ players in 
I
C. Then, coalition structure c , generated by announcements 
* * σ , is called stable 
(i)  under open membership if it satisfies conditions a and b,  
(ii)  under exclusive membership majority voting if it satisfies condition a and either 
condition b or c.1 and  
(iii)  under exclusive membership unanimity voting if it satisfies condition a and either 
b or c.2. 
a) internal stability: " iŒ
C I : v( ≥ . 
**
ii i 1 , ) σσ − =
*
ii i v( 0, ) σσ − =
b) external stability 1: " jŒ
NC I : 
**
j jj 0 , ) σσ − = v( ≥
*
j jj v( 1 , ) σσ − = . 
c) external stability 2: 
**
j jj 0 , ) σσ − = v( <
*
j jj 1 , ) σσ − = v( , 
and 
c.1) $ SÃ
C I , /S/≥ /I
C/2/, " iŒS: v( >v( . 
**
ij j 0, ) σσ − =
*
ij j 1 , ) σσ − =
c.2) $ iŒ
C I :  > . 
**
ij j v( 0, ) σσ − =
*
ij j v( 1 , ) σσ − =
Notice that the last two conditions c.1 and c.2 entail the effect on the payoff of player i if 
player j changes his announcement strategy, intending to join coalition I
C. From Definition 4 
it is evident that the “degree of exclusivity” rises from open to exclusive membership and is 
higher under unanimity than under majority voting. Hence, it is more difficult to upset an 
equilibrium coalition structure under exclusive membership than under open membership and 
under exclusive membership it is more difficult to upset an equilibrium under unanimity vot-
ing than under majority voting. Thus, if we abbreviate the set of equilibrium coalition struc-
tures in the single coalition game under open membership, exclusive membership and major-







SCG(EM-UV) must hold by sim-
ple theoretical reasoning. Therefore, as pointed out in the introduction, the interesting ques-
tion is: what are the welfare and ecological implications of these relations? We will answer 
this question in section 4 with the help of an empirical example. We turn now to stability in 
the context of the multiple coalition game.    10
Multiple Coalition Game 
In a multiple coalition structure, any member of a non-trivial coalition can leave its coalition 
to become a singleton by announcing an address that has not been announced before. Hence, 
internal stability is, again, a necessary condition for stability under all membership rules. 
Moreover, singletons can join a coalition by announcing the same address as coalition mem-
bers of some coalition c
I. However, singletons may also join another singleton. By the same 
token, members of a non-trivial coalition may join another non-trivial coalition or a singleton. 
Thus, in the context of multiple coalitions the meaning of external stability is less obvious 
than in the single coalition game. Hence, we introduce a term called intracoalitional stability.
7 
Under open membership, a coalition structure is intracoalitional stable if no player, regardless 
whether he/she is a singleton or belongs to a non-trivial coalition, has an incentive to join 
another coalition, regardless whether this is a trivial or non-trivial coalition (intracoalitional 
stability condition 1). However, in order to capture the notion of voluntary participation in an 
agreement, it seems necessary to make sure that if a player has an incentive to join a singleton 
player, this player has to agree to accession (intracoalitional stability condition 2). This 
ensures that singletons cannot be forced into cooperation and is captured by intracoalitional 
stability condition 2 in Definition 5 below.
8 
Of course, if either no player has an incentive to change membership or if a player wants to 
join a singleton but this suggestion is turned down by the singleton, this coalition structure is 
also stable under exclusive membership. However, under exclusive membership, we also have 
to consider the possibility that a player, currently being a singleton or belonging to some non-
trivial coalition, wants to join (or switch to) another non-trivial coalition, which may be 
turned down by majority voting (intracoalitional stability condition 3.1) or by unanimity 
(intracoalitional stability condition 3.2). More formally, we have: 
Definition 5:  Stability in the Multiple Coalition Game (MCG) 
In the multiple coalition game, denote the set of players that belong to a non-trivial coalition 
by I





j σ σ = ; let coalition c
I be of size /c
I/ and denote a subset of players in c
I by c
I(S) with size 
/c
I(S)/; let the set of players that belong to trivial coalitions be denote by I
NC with typical ele-




m σ σ ≠  and 
**
ln σ σ ≠ , mŒI\{k}, nŒI\{l} where m and n denote arbi-
                                                 
7    Our definition comprises the notion of external and intercoalitional stability suggested by 
Carrarro (1997). 
8   This is called restricted open membership in Rundshagen (2002).   11
trary players that may belong either to I
C or I
NC. Then, coalition structure c , generated by 
announcements 
*







(i)  under open membership if it satisfies conditions a and either b or c,  
(ii)  under exclusive membership and majority voting if it satisfies condition a and 
either b, c or d.1 and  
(iii)  under exclusive membership and unanimity voting if it satisfies condition a and 
either b, c or d.2. 
a) internal stability: " iŒ
C I , " 
*
im σ σ ≠ , mŒI\{i}:  ≥   
**
ii i v( , ) σσ −
*
ii v( , σσ −
b) intracoalitional stability 1: " mŒI, " 
*
mn σ σ = , nŒI\{m}: v( ≥  
**
mm m , ) σσ −
*
mm m , ) σσ −
c) intracoalitional stability 2: 
*
mk σ σ = , kŒI\{m}, with 
**
kl σ σ ≠ , lŒI\{k}: 
**
mm m v( , ) σσ − <  
*
mm m , ) σσ −
and 
**
km m v( , ) σσ − > . 
*
km m , ) σσ −
d) intracoalitional stability 3: 
**
mi j σ σσ ==, m∉c
I, i,jŒ c
I:  <  
**
mm m v( , ) σσ −
*




I c , /c
I(S)/≥ /c
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() I S c : v( >v(  
**
im m , ) σσ −
*
im m , ) σσ −
d.2) $ iŒc




im m v( , ) σσ −




MCG(EM-UV) where we may recall that MCG stands for 
multiple coalition game, OM, EM-MV and EM-UV denote open membership and exclusive 
membership under majority and unanimity voting, respectively, and C denotes the set of 
equilibria. As pointed out above, we expect that some equilibrium coalition structures com-
prise multiple non-trivial coalitions due to a higher flexibility of finding “suitable partners”. 
However, it is also evident from the discussion that the amount of possible deviations in the 
multiple coalition context is substantially higher than in the single coalition context, making it 
easier to upset a potential equilibrium coalition structure. For instance, suppose that coalition 
structure c*=({1,2},{3},{4},{5},{6}) is internally and externally stable under open member-
ship in the single coalition game. Now suppose that player 3 has an incentive to join player 4 
and vice versa. Then, c* is not stable anymore in the multiple coalition game (and 
c*´=({1,2},{3,4},{5},{6}) may not be stable either). Thus, it will be interesting to observe in   12
section 4, which of the two opposed effects is stronger and what this implies for the success of 
coalition formation. 
3.  The Empirical Background of Coalition Formation 
3.1.  The CLIMNEG World Simulation Model 
The CLIMNEG World Simulation Model (henceforth abbreviated CWSM) is an integrated 
assessment, economy-climate model that resembles closely the seminal RICE model by 
Nordhaus and Yang (1996). We give here only a short and informal overview of CWSM, a 
more detailed description can be found in Eyckmans and Tulkens (1999). The key functions 
and parameters are provided in the Appendix.  
CWSM incoporates an endogenous feedback of climate change damages on production and 
consumption possibilities. The economic part consists of a longterm dynamic, perfect 
foresight Ramsey type of optimal growth model with endogenous investment and carbon 
emission reduction decisions. The world is divided into six regions: USA, JPN (Japan), EU 
(European Union), CHN (China), FSU (Former Soviet Union) and ROW (Rest of the World). 
In each region and in every period t the following budget equation describes how gross 
production,  , can be allocated to consumption,  , investment,  , emission abatement 






i,t i YC ) i,t t YD T ) ∆ : 
  ( ) ( ) i,t i,t i,t i,t i i,t i,t i t YZIY C Y D T =+ + µ + ∆   (1) 
Gross production can be interpreted as “potential GDP”, that is, what could be produced in the 
absence of the climate change problem. Abatement costs are an increasing and convex 
function of emission abatement  [ ] i,t 0,1 µ∈ . Abatement measures the relative emission 
reduction compared to the business-as-usual scenario (BAU) without any abatement policy. 
Climate change damages are an increasing and convex function of temperature change  t T ∆ . 
Abatement costs,  ii , t C( ) µ , and climate change damages,  ii D( T) ∆ , are treated as proportions 
of “potential production”. Hence, total costs and damages are the product of costs and 
damages with “potential” production  , respectively.   i,t Y
Every region is characterized by a production function of the Cobb-Douglas type that maps 
combinations of capital stock and labour input into output. The capital stock increases with 
investment and decreases with some depreciation rate over time. Labour supply is assumed to 
be inelastic and hence production can be viewed as a function of endogenous capital input 
only. Technological progress is assumed to increase exogenously over time, shifting the 
production frontier outwards. Production gives rise to emissions of greenhouse gases that are   13
linked through an emission-output ratio that decreases over time through technological 
progress. Emissions accumulate in the atmosphere according to a standard accumulation 
process. This takes in consideration that only a fraction of emissions adds to the stock of 
greenhouse gases and that the stock decays over time due to a natural process. Carbon 
concentration leads to an increase in temperature that causes environmental damages. We 













∑  (2) 
where ρ  stands for the discount rate of region i and  i Ω denotes the time horizon. The strategy 
vector s consists of a time path (35 decades, starting in 1990) for emission abatement and 
investment for all six regions,  i,t i,t i N;t 0, , s{ I, } ∈ = =µ … Ω , and hence is of length 2x35x6=420.  
3.2.  Computing Valuations 
According to Definition 3, the valuation function maps coalition structures   
into payoffs,  , via an instruction how players choose their economic 
strategies s. Coalition   chooses an investment and emission abatement strategy vector 
 in order to maximize the aggregate discounted welfare over all periods 
for given strategies s
1M c (c ,..., c ) C =∈
*
ii i v( c ) w(( c ) ) w( s) =ε=
k c
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−  of other countries. This gives rise to two first order conditions of 
country i being a member of coalition   in coalition structure c at time t (see Appendix for 
details). Given the public “bad” nature of emissions, the economic strategies of countries are 
interdependent. Therefore, we must simultaneously solve the two first order conditions for 
each country at each time t for every coalition structure c. Since we assume complete 
information, the equilibrium strategy vectors can be interpreted as open loop Nash equilibria. 
In order to compute the valuation function numerically, we use a standard iterative algorithm. 
We never encountered convergence problems and found always a unique equilibrium for each 
of the 203 possible coalition structures.  
k c
As pointed out in section 2, in the case of no transfers valuations   follow immediately 
from equilibrium economic strategies. In the case of transfers, we derive a “corrected 
valuation”  . We adopt the transfer scheme used in Eyckmans and Tulkens 
(1999), which is a modification of the scheme proposed by Chander and Tulkens (1995 and 
1997). The scheme assumes only transfers within coalitions where the surplus of a coalition 
 from cooperation is allocated according to a proportional sharing rule: 
i v (c)
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and   denotes the valuation in some coalition c and   the valuation in the singleton 
coalition structure. The first term in big brackets in (3) sets every country back to its welfare 
level in the singleton coalition structure, the second term allocates the total surplus of coali-
tion   compared to the singleton coalition structure in proportion to their marginal damages. 
Hence, the second term in (3) favors countries with relatively high potential production and/or 
marginal damage estimates and low discount rates since they are entitled to a larger share of 
their coalition´s aggregate payoff. However, the first term ensures that members, which would 
lose from cooperation without transfers because they contribute much to joint abatement but 
benefit only little because of low marginal abatement and damage costs, break at least even 
provided there is a surplus from cooperation. That this may not generally be the case is evi-
dent by noting the following relations.  
() i v c
k c
N
i v( c )
Suppose we start either from the singleton coalition structure c
N or some other coalition 
structure c and that some countries or coalitions merge leading to coalition structure c´. This 
means a change of strategies not only of those countries involved in the merger (insiders) but 
also of those not involved (outsiders) and will affect welfare of all countries (valuations). 
Typically, insiders will increase their abatement efforts but this may be matched by an 
expansion of emissions of outsiders. The amount of these leakage effects depends on the 
particular coalition structure, on the parameters of the marginal damage and cost functions 
and on the physical parameters of the climate system. Thus, individual insiders may lose but 
also aggregate welfare of insiders may decline through a merger. However for our data set, it 
turns out that a merger always increases aggregate welfare of insiders. That is, the 
superadditivity property holds.
9 Hence, our transfer scheme ensures that each coalition 
member receives in any coalition structure different from the singleton coalition structure a 
higher valuation. However, this does not imply that individual insiders are better off in a 
coalition structure   compared to a coalition structure 
N c´ c ≠
N cc ≠  where c´ is derived from a 
merger of insiders. In fact, it is a fundamental feature of coalition formation in the context of a 
                                                 
9   A formal definition is provided for instance in Bloch (1997).   15
global environmental problem that this property does not hold, otherwise full cooperation 
would always be an equilibrium outcome.  
In addition, in our global warming game it can be empirically established that outsiders 
always benefit from a merger, irrespective whether we assume transfers or not. That is, in our 
game, the positive externality property holds (see previous footnote) – a feature that illustrates 
the free-rider incentive in global pollution control. This has two implications. Firstly, every 
country is better off in any coalition structure different from the singleton coalition structure 
with transfers. Without transfers, this is only generally true for singletons. Secondly, we do 
not have to consider profitability as a separate condition in our definition of stability (see, e.g., 
Carraro and Siniscalco 1993) because it is straightforward to show that internal stability is a 
sufficient condition for profitability (see Finus and Rundshagen 2003a). 
3.3.  Reference Simulations 
In order to highlight some general features of our empirical model, we consider some bench-
mark simulation. 
Carbon Emissions and Concentration 
Figure 1 shows annual world carbon emissions in three scenarios: business-as-usual (BAU), 
implying no emission reduction ( ), Nash equilibrium (NASH), corresponding 
to the singleton coalition structure, and social optimum, SOCIAL, correponding to the grand 
coalition.
i,t 0i , µ=∀∀ t
                                                
10 We only consider carbon emissions originating from fossil fuel use where world 
carbon emissions in 1990 amount to approximately 6 gigatons of carbon. BAU-emissions 
continuously grow, reach nearly 40 GtC by the year 2100, and more than 62 GtC in 2200. 
NASH-emissions grow at a slightly slower rate. In contrast, SOCIAL-emissions are 
substantially lower: in 2100 they amount to roughly 24 GtC, and only 21 GtC in 2200. This is 
about half of NASH-emissions in 2100 and almost one third of NASH-emissions in 2200. In 
contrast to NASH and BAU-emissions, the SOCIAL-emission path rises only until 2150, 
levels off at about 26 GtC, and decreases afterwards.  
FIGURE 1 and FIGURE 2 about here 
Figure  2 shows the atmospheric carbon concentration. In 1990 atmospheric carbon 
concentration amounts to approximately 750  GtC. BAU-concentration rises steadily and 
reaches about 1718 GtC in 2100 and 3443 GtC in 2200. Doubling of the concentration with 
 
10  All figures report data for a time horizon of 1990 to 2250. However, all calculations were 
conducted for the entire time period of 350 years.   16
respect to 1990 takes place between 2080 and 2090. The NASH-concentration path follows 
closely the BAU-path. In contrast, SOCIAL-concentration grows at a much slower rate and 
reaches 1368  GtC in 2100 and 2017  GtC in 2200. Doubling of atmospheric carbon 
concentration is postponed until some time between 2110 and 2120. The carbon concentration 
levels off at about 2000 GtC by the year 2200.  
At the level of individual countries there are substantial differences across regions. Taking 
averages of abatement over time, we find in the Nash equilibrium that CHN abates about 
7.70%, followed by EU with 7.24% and USA with 6.44%. The lowest abatement effort is 
undertaken by ROW with only 1.45%. World average abatement amounts to 3.74%. For ROW 
low abatement is due to strong free-rider incentives within this heterogeneous region.
11 For 
CHN high abatement is due to low marginal abatement costs and for EU this is due to their 
high climate change damage valuation. In the social optimum world average abatement is 
37.14%. CHN and ROW are required to reduce their emissions substantially more than other 
regions (68.13% and 55.50%, respectively) due to their low marginal abatement costs.  
Macroreconomic Magnitudes 
Figures 3 and 4 show the time profiles of world consumption, Z, investment, I, abatement 
cost, YC, and damage costs, YD, for NASH- and SOCIAL-scenario where potential 
production, Y, is the sum of these components (see (1)). It is evident that production and 
consumption profiles are quite similar in both scenarios. Small differences stem from the fact 
that abatement costs and damage costs constitute a small portion of total production and 
consumption. Hence, strong differences in the emission and concentration path in both 
scenarios do not alter YC+YD. However, the composition of YC and YD is different in the 
two scenarios. In the Nash equilibrium abatement costs are very small (they do not show up in 
Figure 3) but climate change damage are high. In contrast, in the social optimum damages are 
relatively small but this gain requires devoting part of the production to emission abatement. 
FIGURE 3 and FIGURE 4 about here 
Table  1 displays total discounted consumption  []
t *
ii i , t t0 v( c ) w( s) Z 1
Ω
= i = =+ ρ ∑
S
i v
 for each 
region in the Nash equilibrium,  , and in the social optimum,  .  T h e  l a s t  r o w  World 
reveals the overall magnitudes at stake. Though the gain at the world level from full 
cooperation is not a small number (1,771 million $), in relative terms it amounts to only 
N
i v
                                                 
11    As in Nordhaus and Yang (1996), we have revised downward the climate change damage 
parameter of ROW in all partitions in which ROW is a singleton in order to account for the fact 
that this region consists of many countries.    17
0.52%. This is due three reasons. Firstly, as pointed out above, abatement costs and climate 
change damages are small compared to production or consumption. Secondly, differences 
between both scenarios in terms of welfare occure mainly in the far future but receive less 
weight due to discounting. Thirdly, abatement costs are relatively high compared to the 
benefits from reduced emissions, so that also in the social optimum only moderate action is 
required. Nevertheless, there are large differences between both scenarios in ecological terms: 
emissions are 106 and concentration is 138 percent higher in the Nash equilibrium than in the 
social optimum (see also Table 2 and 3 in section 4). 
Table 1: World Discounted Consumption* 
  N
i v  
S
i v  
SN




i   i t  
S
i ˆ v  
SN
ii ˆˆ (v v )/v −  
USA  78,352 78,989  +0.81  -286  78,703 +0.45 
JPN  42,909   43,224  +0.73  -123  43,101 +0.45 
EU  102,730 103,654  +0.89  -429  103,225 +0.48 
CHN  9,140 8,856  -3.21  +338 9,194 +0.59 
FSU  23,794 24,025  +0.96  -124  23,901 +0.45 
ROW  81,135 81,083  -0.06 +624  81,707  +0.70 
WORLD 338,060 339,831  +0.52  0  339,831  +0.52 
*  Figures are the discounted sum of consumption in million US$1990. All variables as explained in the 
text. 
 
In terms of individual winners and losers, we find that CHN and, to a lesser extent, ROW 
would lose from full cooperation without transfers.
12 With transfers, however, profitability 
holds for all countries in the social optimum and as mentioned above for any other coalition 
structure different from the grand coalitions as well. Hence, without transfers the grand 
coalition can never be an equilibrium. However, profitability is only a necessary condition for 
stability and, as we will see from section 4, by no means sufficient to guarantee stability. 
4.  Stable Coalition Structures 
In this section, we report on results of our stability analysis. In subsection 4.1, we explain the 
information contained in Table 2 and 3 and in subsection 4.2 we provide some rationale that 
helps to explain membership in stable coalitions. In subsection 4.3, we evaluate stable coali-
tion structures. 
                                                 
12   A more detailed analysis of the incentive to cooperate is provided in subsection 4.2.   18
4.1  Information in Table 2 and 3 
Table 2 and 3 list stable coalition structures in the no transfer and transfer case, respectively. 
The first column lists the number of a particular coalition structure where to each coalition 
structure a number between 1 and 203 is attached. Coalition structure no. 1 represents the sin-
gleton coalition structure, corresponding to the "conventional" Nash equilibrium, whereas 
coalition structure no. 203 is the grand coalition, corresponding to the "conventional" social 
optimum. Moreover, coalition structure no. 196 represents the “old Kyoto coalition” before 
the US decided to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol and coalition structure no.  87 cor-
responds to the “new Kyoto coalition” after the US-withdrawal. Apart from stable coalition 
structures, these coalition structures are listed because they represent interesting benchmarks.  
Column 2 lists coalition structures in partition form where non-trivial coalitions are indicated 
bold. Column 3, 4 and 5 contain information whether a coalition is stable (n=not stable, 
y=stable and -=not defined) in the single (S) and multiple coalition game (M) under open 
membership (OM) and under exclusive membership majority voting (EM-MV) and unanimity 
voting (EM-UV).  
TABLE 2 and 3 about here 
Column 6 gives total discounted welfare over all regions and the entire (1990-2330). We take 
this feature to sort coalition structures in descending order. Column 8 gives concentration at 
the end of the period and column 10 indicates global cumulative emissions over the entire 
period. In order to evaluate coalition structures, we compute a "degree of externality index" 
(DEX). This index measures the differences between the outcome in some coalition structure 
c and the social optimum (grand coalition) in relation to the social optimum, expressed as 
percentage. By definition, in the social optimum the degree of externality is 0. Columns 7, 9 
and 11 display this index for welfare, concentration and emissions, respectively. All numbers 
have been rounded to "sensible" digits. 
4.2  Membership in Stable Coalition Structures 
From a first glance at Tables 2 and 3, it seems that intuition is not confirmed: in many coali-
tions there are members of which one would expect that they should show little interest in 
forming a coalition and/or not with those regions listed in Table 2 and 3. For instance, in the 
context of no transfers, it may be suspected that the "rest of the world" (ROW) should show 
little interest in participating in an agreement and that USA and ROW will hardly be in one 
coalition because of different interests. However, a closer inspection of the underlying fun-
damentals resolves this puzzle.   19
Firstly, climate change damage parameters in our model are modified estimates of RICE that 
may not be in line with the presumed perception of regions´ damages. For instance, it has 
been argued that developing countries will pay little attention to environmental damages due 
to strong preferences for economic growth. This would suggest for instance that the damage 
costs of ROW should be very low, though in our model they are relatively high, despite we 
assume higher discount rates for ROW and CHN than for the rest of the countries (see 
Appendix).  
Secondly, the conjecture that countries forming a coalition with other countries are the "good 
guys" and countries remaining singletons are the "bad guys" is premature. This conjecture 
presumes that coalition members will substantially reduce their emissions compared to the 
non-cooperative benchmark and compared to outsiders. However, this may not always be the 
case. For instance, suppose two regions that both have high marginal abatement costs and low 
marginal damages costs form a coalition. Then joint welfare maximization calls only for a 
moderate emission reduction. Hence, internal stability will not be much of a problem for these 
regions. In contrast, a singleton with low marginal abatement costs and high marginal damage 
costs may already reduce emissions substantially by itself.  
Thirdly, not only low abatement but also a homogenous incentive structure among coalition 
members is important for internal stability. In the case of no transfer, clearly, homogenous 
incentives follow from similar marginal abatement and damage costs patterns. However, also 
a region of type 1 (e.g., ROW) with relatively low marginal abatement costs and high mar-
ginal damages and a region of type 2 (e.g., JPN) where this is reversed have a similar incen-
tive structure. Type 1 contributes much to joint abatement but also benefits much whereas for 
type 2 this is reversed. Hence, contributions and gains are equally distributed. In such a coali-
tion also a region of type 3 (e.g., USA and FSU) with moderate marginal abatement costs and 
marginal damages may fit in. This explains why USA, JPN, FSU and ROW are frequent 
members of stable coalition structures as listed in Table 2. 
In contrast, a region of type 4 (e.g., EU) with relatively high marginal abatement and damage 
costs finds it difficult to find partners for cooperation (though it has much interest in coopera-
tion). It contributes relatively little to joint abatement but benefits more than proportionally. 
Moreover, it causes that a high abatement target is implemented within the coalition due to its 
high marginal damages. This explains why EU is a member of a coalition in only two coali-
tion structures listed in Table 2. 
Finally, a region of type 5 (e.g., CHN) with low marginal abatement and marginal damage 
costs would find many cooperating partners but has no incentive itself to join a coalition as   20
long as there is no compensation. This explains why CHN is no coalition member of any sta-
ble coalition structure listed in Table 2. This is different in the case of transfers (see Table 3). 
Now interests are more balanced. CHN is compensated for her high contribution and receives 
a fair share of the gains from cooperation. For other regions, cooperation with CHN but also 
with ROW is attractive since this lowers abatement costs of joint cooperation.  
Fourthly, not only the lack of internal stability but also of external or intracoalitional stability 
explains membership. For instance, under open membership and to some extent under exclu-
sive membership with majority voting coalitions including CHN are not stable because out-
siders would have an incentive to join.  
4.3  Evaluating Stable Coalition Structures 
General comments 
From Tables 2 and 3, it is evident that the singleton coalition structure (no. 1) is stable in the 
single but not in the multiple coalition game. In the single coalition game this is an “artificial 
result” of the construction of the game but does not affect the subsequent interpretations. If 
each player announces i 0 σ = , then no single player can change his/her membership by a sin-
gle deviation. In other words, the singleton coalition structure is stable by definition.
13 In the 
multiple coalition game, this is different. Suppose each player announces a different address. 
Then coalition structure no. 1 is only stable if either no player has an incentive to join another 
singleton by announcing the same address (intracoalitional stability 1) or if there is such an 
incentive and the second player has no interest in such a merger (intracoalitional stability 2). 
However, since there are four coalition structures of the form ({i,j},{k},{l},{m},{n}) in the 
no transfer case (no. 2, 4, 5 and 6) and five in the transfer case (no. 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) that are 
internally stable, it is evident that there are enough regions that have an interest in a merger 
with another region and hence no. 1 cannot be intracoalitional stable. 
The grand coalition is not stable regardless how stability is defined. In the no transfer case 
this follows immediately from the fact that CHN and ROW are worse off than in the singleton 
coalition structure (see Table 1). However, profitability is only a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for internal stability. An important reason for instability is high abatement contribu-
tions of all participants as this is the case in the social optimum. Hence, it is particular attrac-
tive for a member to leave the grand coalition because this reduces abatement costs substan-
                                                 
13   Of course, the advantage of this construction is that existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed 
which may not be the case in the multiple coalition game. For discussion of this and related 
issues see Finus/Rundshagen (2003c).   21
tially but increases damages only moderately. A similar argument explains why also coali-
tions of five or four regions are not stable: the incentive to leave a coalition increases with the 
number of coalition members. Therefore, it also not surprising that we find in line with other 
studies (e.g., Barrett 1998, Bosello et al. 2001, Eyckmans 2001, Finus et al. 2003 and Tulkens 
et al. 1999) that neither the “old” nor the “new” Kyoto coalition is stable. Of course, in our 
setting abatement targets follow from the assumption of the valuation function and may there-
fore differ from those agreed in Kyoto and subsequent COP-meetings. Also welfare implica-
tions may be different because we do not model permit trading. Nevertheless, our results help 
to explain the difficulties in Kyoto and subsequent meetings to reach a final agreement and to 
gather enough ratification so that the protocol enters into force.  
Interestingly, our results also suggest that both Kyoto coalitions (new and old) would not 
much narrow the gap between social optimum and Nash equilibrium and that there are many 
other coalition structures that would perform far better. Given the caveats mentioned above, 
this indicates that a subgroup of the Kyoto coalition could improve upon the outcome of the 
negotiations by looking for different members. Of course, this may require some transfer to 
provide sufficient incentives for others to join.  
Our results also confirm two general conclusions from the theoretical literature assuming 
symmetric countries that have been mentioned in the introduction. 1) The number of partici-
pants is not necessarily a good indicator for the success of an IEA. For instance, the old Kyoto 
coalition (coalition structure no. 196) counts four members, is not stable, and is inferior in 
welfare and ecological terms to many other stable coalition structures with and without trans-
fers. Also coalition structure no. 4 with only one coalition of two members is superior to coa-
lition structure no. 20 with one coalition of three members and no. 153 with two coalitions of 
two members that are all stable in the multiple coalition game under exclusive membership, 
unanimity voting and no transfers (see Table 2). 2) Whenever the degree of externality is low, 
only small coalitions are stable but they achieve much and if the degree is high, the opposite 
holds. In our context, this degree is small in welfare terms (0.52 percent; though admittedly it 
is larger in ecological terms) since abatement costs are relatively high compared to the bene-
fits from reduced damages. In our setting, the largest single coalition comprises three mem-
bers and the largest coalition in a coalition structure with multiple coalitions comprises two 
members. Nevertheless, those small coalitions close the gap between social optimum and 
Nash equilibrium substantially. For instance, in the case of no transfer coalition structure 
no. 26 (that is stable under EM-UV; see Table 2) reduces the gap by more than a half in wel-
fare and ecological terms and in the case of transfers coalition structure no. 31 (that is stable 
under EM-MV and EM-UV in the multiple coalition game; see Table 3) closes this gap even   22
more. As Barrett (1994) pointed out, this relation may be reversed for CFCs, predicting large 
coalitions but less success for solving the problem of the depletion of the ozone layer effec-
tively.  
Open versus exclusive membership 
In the no transfer case (Table 2), it is evident that no non-trivial coalition structure is stable 
under open membership, a few are stable under exclusive membership and majority voting 
and relatively many under exclusive membership and unanimity voting. This applies to the 
single and multiple coalition game. More important, those additional equilibrium coalition 
structures imply higher welfare and lower emissions and concentrations. In the case of trans-
fers, the difference is less pronounced. In the single coalition game, the set of equilibrium 
coalitions for all membership rules is the same. However, in the multiple coalition game, a 
similar general conclusion as mentioned for no transfers can be drawn.  
From a theoretical point of view, the results are interesting since they suggest that the 
assumption of open membership is crucial for the negative conclusions derived in the litera-
ture. From an applied point of view, the results are interesting in two respects. Firstly, it sug-
gests that it may be worthwhile to think whether to adopt an exclusive membership rule, 
which is typical for club good agreements, also for public good agreements like those on cli-
mate change in the future. Majority voting is inferior to unanimity voting but still improves on 
the open membership rule. Secondly, voting under exclusive membership requires some 
degree of consensus among coalition partners. Thus, though it is usually argued that the need 
for consensus within international organization and governments has a negative impact on 
efficiency and effectiveness, in the present context consensus is conducive to cooperation, 
helping to stabilize an IEA.  
Single versus Multiple Coalitions  
Firstly, we observe that if coalition formation is not restricted to a single coalition multiple 
coalitions emerge in equilibrium. Of course, considering the membership in these coalition 
structures suggest that it is more appropriate to talk about multiple instead of regional agree-
ments. It is not the geographical distance that decides on membership but the “distance in the 
incentive pattern”. Secondly, we observe that in the case of transfers the four firstly ranked 
coalition structures in terms of global welfare are coalition structures with multiple coalitions. 
Thirdly, our previous conjecture of section 2 is confirmed that regions that have no incentive 
to join a coalition will form their own coalition if this is possible and this implies a Pareto-
improvement. For instance, in the case of no transfers coalition structure no.  2 
({FSU,ROW},{USA},{JPN},{EU},{CHN}) is stable in the single coalition game under   23
exclusive membership. In the multiple coalition game, this coalition structure is not stable 
anymore because USA and JPN have an incentive to form a second coalition leading to coali-
tion structure no.  153 ({USA,JPN},{FSU,ROW},{EU},{CHN}). Because of the positive 
externality property, this implies that not only USA and JPN benefit from this merger but all 
other regions as well. A similar relation holds for coalition structures like no. 4 and 155 and in 
the case of transfers between coalition structures no. 5 and 30, no. 6 and 31, no. 3 and 117 and 
no. 4 and 46. This suggests that lifting the restriction of a single agreement has a positive 
impact on cooperation. Obviously, in our setting, the higher flexibility of finding suitable 
cooperators outweighs the higher flexibility in terms of possible deviations in a multiple coa-
lition game compared to a single coalition game. 
From a theoretical point of view the results are interesting in two respects. Firstly, they 
demonstrate that not only for symmetric players but also for heterogeneous players we can 
expect that multiple coalitions form in equilibrium. Secondly, they illustrate that the option to 
form multiple coalitions will enhance the prospectives for cooperation – a conjecture that 
could not be substantiated by theory so far. From an applied point of view our results support 
the efforts in recent IEAs not to treat all members and potential members equally. In fact, it 
may be worthwhile to draft different protocols that suite different groups of countries. In this 
sense, it may be questioned whether it was a clever strategy by the USA before they dropped 
out of the Kyoto Protocol to link their ratification to the acceptance of emission ceilings by 
developing countries like CHN and India. It may well be the case that more could have been 
achieved if separate protocols were designed for industrialized countries, developing countries 
and countries in transition. 
No transfers versus transfers  
Tables 2 and 3 reveal that the first four stable coalition structures in the multiple coalition 
game under exclusive membership in the case of transfers (no. 31 to 30) are superior to the 
coalition structure with the highest welfare in the case of no transfers (no. 26). Thus, the con-
jecture is confirmed that transfers are an important tool to increase participation and the suc-
cess of stable agreements. Nevertheless, also transfers cannot totally overcome free-rider 
incentives and hence stable coalition structures comprise only small coalitions and welfare is 
below, as well as concentration and emissions are above globally optimal levels.  
The results are in line with almost all theoretical and empirical findings of coalition models 
that show that transfers lead to superior outcomes (see the literature discussed and cited in 
Finus 2003a). The results also support efforts within recent IEAs, like the Montreal and Kyoto 
Protocol, to establish multilateral funds that compensate developing countries for cooperation.    24
5. Summary  and  Conclusions 
We modeled coalition formation in international climate change control as a two stage game: 
in the first stage countries/regions decide on their membership in a coalition and in the second 
stage coalition members choose their economic strategies. For the first stage, we considered a 
single and a multiple coalition game. In the second stage, we assumed that coalition members 
jointly choose abatement and capital investment strategies as to maximize the aggregate wel-
fare to their coalition. We argued that the entire game can be analyzed as a reduced stage 
game in which players decide on their membership since they know the welfare implications 
of the second stage. Consequently, stability can be defined in terms of membership strategies. 
We considered two modifications of the classical definition of internal and external stability 
that implicitly makes two assumptions: a) open membership (no restriction on accession to an 
agreement) and b) single agreement (regions can only decide to sign or not to sign an agree-
ment but cannot form separate agreements). The first modification extended open member-
ship to exclusive membership. That is, players that have an incentive to join a coalition 
require the consent of the existing members. We modeled this as a voting procedure where 
members either decide by majority or unanimity voting on the application of accession. The 
second modification lifted the restriction of a single agreement and allowed for the co-exis-
tence of multiple agreements.  
We used an empirical growth equilibrium model that captures a time horizon of 350 years to 
compute payoff vectors (valuations) for six world regions and for each of the 203 possible 
coalition structures. Subsequently, we computed stable (equilibrium) coalition structures and 
evaluated them in terms of global welfare, concentration and total emissions. From the many 
results, we would like to mention four. 1) Neither the grand coalition, which is identical to the 
social optimum, nor the Kyoto coalition in its original (including USA) and in its present form 
(without the USA) are stable, regardless of the membership rule. Only coalitions with few 
members are stable. Nevertheless, in the context of climate change they can close the gap 
between no and full cooperation to a large extent. Thus, "small may be beautiful (or least not 
that ugly)"! 2) Under exclusive membership more coalition structures are stable than under 
open membership that are also superior in welfare and ecological terms. This is particularly 
true for unanimity voting. We suggested considering changing the open access rule of most 
IEAs to restricted access in future IEAs as implied by most club good agreements. Moreover, 
the results indicate that the need for consensus in international politics may not always 
hamper, but, in fact, may be conducive for the implementation of ambitious abatement poli-
cies. 3) Many stable coalition structures comprise multiple coalitions that are superior to a   25
single coalition in welfare and ecological terms. The reason is that it is difficult to form one 
large coalition because of strong free-rider incentives but it is easier to form several small 
coalitions because interests within a coalition are more homogeneous. This suggests not pur-
suing a strategy to get as many countries into "one climate boat" in future treaties but to allow 
for different protocols/agreements. 4) Without transfers, countries with a similar incentive 
structure in terms of marginal abatement and damage costs form coalitions. Countries with 
simultaneously either very low or high marginal abatement and damage costs will usually not 
participate in cooperation since they do not find "equally-minded" partners. With transfers, 
contrasting interests can be balanced. This allows reaping efficiency gains from cooperation. 
The result supports the efforts in recent IEAs like the Kyoto and Montreal Protocol to raise 
participation of developing countries via compensation payments.  
For future research, we would like to mention three (of certainly many possible) extensions. 
Firstly, other transfer schemes than the Chander/Tulkens´ transfer rule that we considered 
could be analyzed. The purpose of this exercise would be to find an "optimal transfer scheme" 
that allows - in the face of heterogeneous interests - for stable coalition structures generating 
high global welfare. Secondly, and closely related to the first point, the effect of different 
permit trading schemes on coalition formation could be analyzed. This may include the cur-
rently discussed schemes in the Kyoto Protocol but also alternative forms as discussed for 
instance in Böhringer (2002), Buchner and Carraro (2003), Kverndokk (1995) and Rose et al. 
(1998). Thirdly, stability may not only be defined in terms of single deviations but also in 
terms of multiple deviations. Whereas this is a straightforward exercise in theory (e.g., Finus 
and Rundshagen 2003c), we recognize that this is an ambitious task in an empirical context of 
203 different coalition structures. 
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  List of Variables 
 
i,t Y   production (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t Z   consumption (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t I   investment (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t K   capital stock (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t C   cost of abatement (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t D   damage from climate change (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t E   carbon emissions (billion tons of C) 
i,t µ  emission  abatement 
t M   atmospheric carbon concentration (billion tons of C) 
t F
x
  radiative forcing (Watt per m²) 
t F
a
  exogenous radiative forcing (Watt per m²) 
t T
0
  temperature increase in the atmosphere (°C) 
t T   temperature increase in the deep ocean (°C) 
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Global Parameter Values 
i,t L 
i,t α  
K δ      
γ       
β      
M δ     
1 τ       
2 τ       





M      
     
0
0 T      
i,t a  productivity 
population 
emission-output rate 
capital depreciation rate 
capital productivity parameter 
airborne fraction of carbon emissions 
atmospheric carbon removal rate 
parameter temperature relationship 
parameter temperature relationship 
parameter temperature relationship 
parameter temperature relationship 
initial carbon concentration 
initial temperature atmosphere 






































  Regional Parameter Values 
 
    i,1 θ   i,2 θ   i,1 b   i,2 b   i ρ  
USA 0.01102  2.0 0.07  2.887 0.015
JPN 0.01174 2.0 0.05 2.887 0.015
EU 0.01174  2.0  0.05  2.887 0.015
CHN 0.01523  2.0  0.15  2.887 0.030
FSU 0.00857 2.0 0.15 2.887 0.015













  Variables in 1990 (Reference Year)* 
 
  0
i Y  (%)  0 K 
0 L 
0 E  i (%) 
i (%) 
i (%) 
USA 5,464.796 25.9  14,262.510 26.3 250.372 4.8  1.360 20.5
JPN 2,932.055 13.9  8,442.250 15.6 123.537 2.4  0.292  10.9
EU 6,828.042 32.4  18,435.710 34.0 366.497 7.0  0.872  28.9
CHN 370.024 1.8  1,025.790 1.9 1,133.683 21.5  0.669  3.0
FSU 855.207 4.1  2,281.900 4.2 289.324 5.5  1.066  6.8
ROW 4,628.621 22.0  9,842.220 18.1 3,102.689 58.9  1.700  29.9
World 21,078.750 100.0 54,290.380 100.0 5,266.100 100.0  5.959  100.0
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203 {USA,JPN,EU,CHN,FSU,ROW}  n  n  n  n  n  n  339830.726 0.00  1912.907  0.00  772.529  0.00 
26  {USA,FSU,ROW},{JPN},{EU},{CHN}                      n n n n y y 339134.977 0.21 3411.761 78.35 1228.558 59.03
156 {USA,JPN,ROW},{EU},{CHN},{FSU}                      n n n n y y 339105.160 0.21 3455.612 80.65 1240.635 60.59
155 {USA,JPN},{EU,ROW},{CHN},{FSU}                      - n - y - y 339088.903 0.22 3469.536 81.38 1245.867 61.27
4  {EU,ROW},{USA},{JPN},{CHN},{FSU}                      n n y n y n 339077,348 0.22 3474.433 81.63 1247.764 61.52
20  {JPN,FSU,ROW},{USA},{EU},{CHN}                      n n n n y y 339019.573 0.24 3648.097 90.71 1299.488 68.21
6                        {USA,ROW},{JPN},{EU},{CHN},{FSU} n n y y y y 339018.374 0.24 3622.360 89.36 1292.177 67.27
153 {USA,JPN},{FSU,ROW},{EU},{CHN}                    - n - y - y 338907.856 0.27 3839.731 100.73 1358.172 75.81
2  {FSU,ROW},{USA},{JPN},{EU},{CHN}  n                  n y n y n 338895,952 0.28 3844.839 100.99 1360.210 76.07
5  {JPN,ROW},{USA},{EU},{CHN},{FSU}                    n n y y y y 338882.175 0.28 3898.367 103.79 1373.392 77.78
196 {USA,JPN,EU,FSU},{CHN},{ROW}  n  n  n  n  n  n  338149.623 0.49  4508.541  135.69 1575.837 103.98 
87  {JPN,EU,FSU},{USA},{CHN},{ROW}  n  n  n  n  n  n  338111.881 0.51  4530.523  136.84 1584.988 105.17 
1  {USA},{JPN},{EU},{CHN},{FSU},{ROW}  y  n  y  n  y  n  338059.826 0.52  4550.202  137.87 1593.398 106.26 
  
 
























203 {USA,JPN,EU,CHN,FSU,ROW}  n n n  n  n  n  339830.726 0.00  1912.907  0.00  772.529  0.00 
31  {USA,ROW},{EU,CHN},{JPN},{FSU}  - n -              y - y 339378.119 0.13 3185.380 66.52  1157.776 49.87
46  {JPN,CHN},{EU,ROW},{USA},{FSU}  - y -              y - y 339265.727 0.17 3270.385 70.96  1184.793 53.37
28  {EU,CHN},{FSU,ROW},{USA},{JPN}  - n -              y - y 339249.498 0.17 3420.970 78.84  1229.317 59.13
30  {JPN,ROW},{EU,CHN},{USA},{FSU}  - n -              y - y 339234.553 0.18 3477.597 81.80  1243.367 60.95
4  {EU,ROW},{USA},{JPN},{CHN},{FSU}                y n y n y n 339077,348 0.22 3474.433 81.63  1247.764 61.52
117 {USA,EU},{CHN,ROW},{JPN},{FSU}  - n -              y - y 339054.455 0.23 3971.249 107.60 1380.521 78.70
3  {CHN,ROW},{USA},{JPN},{EU},{FSU}  y n y              n y n 339026.549 0.24 3986.954 108.42 1386.628 79.49
6  {USA,ROW},{JPN},{EU},{CHN},{FSU}  y n y              n y n 339018.374 0.24 3622.360 89.36  1292.177 67.27
2  {FSU,ROW},{USA},{JPN},{EU},{CHN}  y n y              n y n 338895.952 0.28 3844.839 100.99 1360.210 76.07
5  {JPN,ROW},{USA},{EU},{CHN},{FSU}   y n y              n y n 338882.175 0.28 3898.367 103.79 1373.392 77.78
196 {USA,JPN,EU,FSU},{CHN},{ROW}  n n n  n  n  n  338149.623 0.49  4508.541  135.69 1575.837 103.98 
87  {JPN,EU,FSU},{USA},{CHN},{ROW}  n n n  n  n  n  338111.881 0.51  4530.523  136.84 1584.988 105.17 
1  {USA},{JPN},{EU},{CHN},{FSU},{ROW}  y n y  n  y  n  338059.826 0.52  4550.202  137.87 1593.398 106.26 
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*  Y=Z+I+YC+YD as in equation (1). World production in 1990 is nomalized to 100. 
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